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Symmetric extendibility of quantum states has recently drawn attention in the context of quantum
cryptography to judge whether quantum states shared between two distant parties can be purified by
means of one-way error correction protocols. In this letter we study the symmetric extendibility in a
specific class of two-qudit states, i. e. states composed of two d-level systems, in order to find upper
bounds on tolerable error rates for a wide class of qudit-based quantum cryptographic protocols
using two-way error correction. In important cases these bounds coincide with previously known
lower bounds, thereby proving sharpness of these bounds in arbitrary finite-dimensional systems.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Quantum cryptography or quantum key distribution
was introduced by the seminal work of Bennett and Bras-
sard in 1984 [1]. It was widely conjectured to provide
means for unconditionally secure communication of two
distant parties, Alice and Bob, even in the presence of
an adversary, Eve, who can be detected by the quantum-
mechanically-induced noise every attack produces. How-
ever, security proofs still left loopholes, until Mayers [2]
came up with a proof which provided unconditional secu-
rity even for some finite amount of noise. Since every real
physical channel inevitably produces noise, however low
it may be, this proof amounts to the advent of practically
useful quantum cryptography. Starting from this work,
the security of quantum cryptography has been investi-
gated in various scenarios and its security was proved
therein. Whereas most of the efforts have been per-
formed with respect to two-dimensional systems (qubits
with Hilbert space H = C2) as basic quantum systems, a
large number of concepts and methods carry through for
arbitrary finite-dimensional systems (qudits with Hilbert
space H = Cd). Such general finite-dimensional sys-
tems will be the main focus of this letter. However, we
do not consider infinite-dimensional systems (continuous-
variable quantum key distribution), since the protocols
and scenarios employed there differ considerably from the
finite-dimensional case.
A particularly important task in quantum-
cryptography-related research is to identify maximally
tolerable error rates, i. e. the error rates measurable
by Alice and Bob, up to which a physical channel
may be used for quantum key distribution without
compromising the unconditional security. For the BB84
protocol, this question can be answered by considering
an entanglement-based version [3] of that protocol with
an appropriate choice of entanglement purification.
Under particular circumstances, this protocol can be
reduced to yield security of the original BB84 protocol
itself by transforming the entanglement purification
to some post-processing, namely error correction and
privacy amplification. One generically distiguishes
two types of post-processing. The first kind only uses
one-way classical communication, i. e. in the course of
post-processing Alice may send classical information
to Bob, but not vice versa; Shor and Preskill used
such protocols to show security of the BB84 protocol
up to an error rate of 11.0% [4]. The second kind of
post-processing uses both one- and two-way classical
communication [5], and this can be used to derive
tolerable error rates of 20% for the BB84 protocol
[6, 7, 8]. (One should note, that by one-way protocols
only, it is impossible to exceed a rate of about 15%,
since an arbitrary qubit state can be duplicated, if this
rate of error is allowed.) By now no protocol is known
which works above 20% error rate, although it has been
shown [9] that effective entanglement, which is necessary
for key generation, exists up to an error rate of 25%.
At present, there exists no purification protocol which
works between these two bounds, and it is unknown
whether this gap can be closed at all.
A different approach to investigate this problem was
recently undertaken by Myhr et al. [10, 11], who posed
the question, which condition a quantum state has to
fulfil in order to be correctable, using one-way classical
communication only. They found that the concept of
symmetric extendibility served their purpose, i. e. that a
state which possesses a symmetric extension cannot be
purified by any possible protocol with one-way commu-
nication only. By working out a criterion for symmetric
extendibility for two-qubit states they achieved to show
that the abovementioned bound of 20% cannot be sur-
passed by standard means of two-way entanglement pu-
rification [5, 6, 7, 8], which indicates the need of new
two-way protocols. Finally, we should note that all re-
sults we mentioned for the BB84 protocol carry over for
the six-state protocol [12], if the rates of 20% and 25%
are replaced by 27.6% and 33.3% [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11].
The aforementioned results show that the tolerable er-
ror rates of the most important qubit-based protocols are
known, at least in a reasonable scenario using the error
correction and privacy amplification available at present.
One may ask whether similar results hold true for gen-
eral finite-dimensional systems, in case we use generalised
2BB84 and six-state schemes. While lower bounds for
such cases are known [13, 14, 15, 16], with the excep-
tion of disentanglement bounds [17] we are not aware of
a systematic study of upper bounds, which is the main
purpose of this letter. By performing an analysis similar
to that of Myhr et al., we will derive upper bounds on
the tolerable error rates with two-way communication.
As Myhr et al. did for qubit-based protocols, we show
that these upper bounds coincide with the lower bounds
already known [13, 14, 15, 16], thus proving sharpness of
these bounds. In the following we will state the details
of the model and our proof.
Let us start by introducing the concept of symmetric
extendibility and its relevance in quantum cryptography
[10, 11, 18].
Definition (Symmetric extendibility)
A state ρAB on the tensor product HA⊗HB of two Hilbert
spaces is said to be symmetrically extendible, if there
exists a tripartite state ρABE on HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE with
HE = HB, such that TrE ρABE = ρAB (extendibility)
and ρABE = ρAEB (symmetry) hold.
Obviously all separable states possess symmetric exten-
sions, whilst no pure entangled state can be extended.
The general solution to the problem, whether a state is
symmetrically extendible or not is unsolved, however, a
criterion for Bell-diagonal two-qubit states is known [10]
and, more generally, criteria for general two-qubit states
have been investigated [11]. The relevance of symmetric
extendibility in quantum cryptography arises from the
following observation [10]: If Alice and Bob share a sym-
metrically extendible state, we cannot exclude the pos-
sibility that Eve holds the extension. If Alice then tries
to use one-way communication to establish a secret key
with Bob, she will fail, since Eve could do precisely the
same as Bob, and Bob and Eve are indistinguishable to
Alice.
We shall now introduce a class of two-qudit states,
which was shown to be relevant in quantum cryptog-
raphy. For states within this class we have derived a
criterion for symmetric extendibility (Theorem 1), which
enables us to obtain a simple sufficient condition for this
property. Based upon this condition, we will derive upper
bounds for qudit-based quantum cryptographic protocols
and compare them with the previously known results. To
this end, we will in the course of this letter focus on a
particular two-way error correction step, the B
(d)
n step
(see below), which is essentially the only genuine two-way
post-processing method used in quantum cryptography.
Applying this step to a chosen initial state, we will check
whether we can reach a state which does not possess a
symmetric extension. If this is not the case, we conclude
that no protocol in the class considered can produce a
secret key for a particular given error rate. The bounds
which we derive lie below the disentanglement threshold
[17]. Thus, in order to achieve this threshold—if it is pos-
sible at all—new two-way methods have to be invented.
To determine whether a general state is symmet-
rically extendible or not is a complicated task, even
for two-qubit states [11]. However, in the context of
entanglement-based quantum cryptography by using ar-
guments of the Gottesman-Lo type [5] we may concen-
trate on a subclass of all states, namely the (generalised)
Bell-diagonal states [5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15] onH = Cd⊗Cd
where d is the dimension of a single quantum system,
shared by Alice and Bob. This is achieved by a fictive-
measurement argument [5]: One can perform a measure-
ment in the so-called Bell basis before starting the ac-
tual protocol, and such measurement does not have any
measurable effect on the key. The Bell basis consists of
vectors (we denote z := exp[2pii/d], and ⊖ is to be taken
modulo d)
|Ψlm〉 := d
−1/2
∑d−1
k=0
zlk|k〉|k ⊖m〉. (1)
for l, m ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}, and the Bell-diagonal states
can be written in the form
ρ =
∑d−1
l,m=0
Alm|Ψlm〉〈Ψlm|. (2)
These states are completely determined by their coeffi-
cient matrix (Alm)
d−1
l,m=0. Choosing the perfect state to
be |Ψ00〉〈Ψ00|—Alice and Bob can locally measure in the
standard basis and get one perfectly correlated key dit—
we can interpret nonzero l and m to be phase and dit
errors, respectively.
In quantum cryptography we may assume that Alice
and Bob share a large number of identical Bell-diagonal
states, i. e. ρ⊗N for Bell-diagonal ρ and N ≫ 1, which
have to be processed by using one-way and two-way com-
munication to yield the state |Ψ00〉〈Ψ00| [5]. Assuming
that the state does not possess a symmetric extension, we
have to use two-way entanglement purification in order
to break the symmetric extension [10, 11]. Apart from
minor modifications, all known genuine two-way proto-
cols are variations of the B
(d)
n step, so we may focus on
that particular step [15]: Alice and Bob choose n ∈ N
qudit pairs, all prepared in the state ρ with coefficients
(Alm)
d−1
l,m=0. They then locally apply generalised XOR
operations |i〉|j〉 7→ |i〉|i ⊖ j〉 from the first to all other
pairs and afterwards measure the dit values of all pairs
except the first one. They compare the parities of all n−1
measurements by means of classical (two-way) communi-
cation and keep the first pair, only if all parities coincide.
If they keep the first pair, it will be described by coeffi-
cients (A′lm)
d−1
l,m=0, which are given by [15]
A′lm = (dN)
−1
∑d−1
i=0
[
z−il
(∑d−1
j=0
zijAjm
)n]
, (3)
where N :=
∑d−1
m=0
(∑d−1
l=0 Alm
)n
. This state has in
general less dit errors but more phase errors than the
3original state by the properties of the generalised XOR.
Since we can assume an error rate below 50% [17], i. e.∑
lAl0 > 1/2, in the limit of large n ∈ N, the output
state of the B
(d)
n step lies in the neighbourhood of the
separable state defined by Alm = d
−1δm0.
We can even further reduce the set of states which
have to be taken into consideration by enforcing their
invariance with respect to the Abelian unitary group
U2 := {U ⊗ U
∗|U diagonal in the standard basis}. This
is due to the fact that the B
(d)
n step eliminates all kinds
of error affected by this symmetrisation, so that they do
not enter in the one-way correction part [15]. Such U2-
invariant Bell-diagonal states are characterised by the
additional property that Alm = d
−1A∗m holds with
A∗m :=
∑
lAlm for all m 6= 0.
One can now try to explicitly construct a symmetric
extension of the given state as a d3× d3 matrix. The U2-
invariance implies that a symmetric extension, if it ex-
ists at all, can be chosen to be invariant with respect to
U3 := {U ⊗ U
∗ ⊗ U∗|U diagonal in the standard basis},
and this leads to a block matrix structure of the ex-
tension. By some further processing, one can work out
a criterion for symmetric extendibility for U2-invariant
Bell-diagonal states. Defining A˜ip :=
∑
l Al0z
l(i−p), this
criterion reads as follows [19, 20, p. 91].
Theorem 1 (Symmetric extendibility)
A U2-invariant Bell-diagonal state is symmetrically
extendible, if and only if (d−1A˜ip)ip ∈ C
d×d can be de-
composed into the sum of d matrices B0, B1, . . . , Bd−1,
such that every matrix Bk = (a
(k)
ip )ip is positive and
a
(k)
ii ≤ d
−1A∗,i⊖k for all i, k ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}.
Although this condition is in general difficult to check, it
turns out that it is sufficient for calculating upper bounds
on tolerable error rates in quantum cryptography. To this
end, we have to find an explicit solution to Theorem 1
nearby the state with coefficients Alm = d
−1δm0 as men-
tioned before.
For such a state A∗0 ≈ 1 and A∗m ≈ 0 for m 6= 0
hold. Comparing this with Theorem 1, we conclude that
in every matrix Bk one of the diagonal elements can be
large, while all others have to be small. Thus we are
tempted to choose the matrix e. g. B0 to have the form

α η∗1 η
∗
2 . . . η
∗
d−1
η1 β1 0 . . . 0
η2 0 β2
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
ηd−1 0 . . . 0 βd−1


∈ Cd×d, (4)
where α = a
(0)
00 may be large and the βi = a
(0)
ii have to be
small. For the other Bk we assume a similar structure,
but α and the ηi lie on the (k − 1)-th row and column.
Since the matrix has to be positive, and thus every 2× 2
principal minor must be non-negative, we may say that
the elements set to zero have to be quadratically small
in β
1/2
i , whilst the ηi are only linearly small.
The point of enforcing this matrix structure is that it is
positive, if and only if (a) all diagonal elements are non-
negative and (b) its determinant is non-negative. This
follows by direct application of the well-known Hurwitz-
Sylvester criterion for positive semidefiniteness, which
states that a Hermitian matrix is positive semidefinite,
if and only if all principal minors are non-negative; see
e. g. [21, p. 282]. If all βk are strictly positive, we can
write the determinant of the matrix in (4) as(∏d−1
l=0
βl
)
×
(
α−
∑d−1
k=1
|ηk|
2
βk
)
, (5)
and we may focus on the right factor of that product.
We now want to construct a matrix B0 of the form
mentioned in eq. (4). The other matrices Bk shall have
the same entries, but the row and column structure is per-
muted according to the conditions of Theorem 1. Note
that the exceptional element α for these Bk wanders
along the diagonal with increasing k = 0, 1, . . . , d − 1,
but that does not alter positivity. It seems appropriate
to set the small values βm to their maximally possible
value βm := d
−1A∗m according to Theorem 1, so nor-
malisation enforces α := (2A∗0− 1)/d. Since all diagonal
elements are non-negative, we find
∑d−1
m=1
|ηm|
2
d−1A∗m
≤
2A∗0 − 1
d
=
1− 2(1−A∗0)
d
(6)
to be necessary and sufficient for positivity. (Given the
case that some A∗m = 0, this is to be interpreted that
the coefficient ηm must vanish.) For a state to be sym-
metrically extendible, ηm + η
∗
d⊖m = d
−1A˜m0 must hold
in addition for all m ∈ {1, . . . , d− 1}. Since in the in-
equality (6), there appear only absolute values, we may
set the phases of ηm and η
∗
d⊖m to be equal, for choos-
ing small |ηi| does not harm positivity. We thus remain
with the condition |ηm| + |ηd⊖m| = d
−1|A˜m0|. Setting
|ηm| =: χmd
−1|A˜m0|, we can rewrite the inequality as
∑d−1
m=1
[
χ2m
|A˜m0|
2
A∗m
+ 2A∗m
]
≤ 1, (7)
which is to be fulfilled under the additional constraint
χm + χd⊖m = 1.
Applying a B
(d)
n step to the state, equation (3) implies
A′∗m = A
n
∗m/N and A˜
′
m0 = A˜
n
m0/N with N =
∑
mA
n
∗m,
and the condition then reads
∑d−1
m=1
[
χ2m
1
N
(
|A˜m0|
2
A∗m
)n
+ 2
An∗m
N
]
≤ 1. (8)
We shall ignore the second term in the limit n→∞, since
it converges to zero. For the first term we can use the
inequality N ≤ An∗0, which gets tight for n→∞. The
4term in question then is |A˜m0|
2/(A∗0A∗m); if it is less
than 1, it will disappear for n→∞, otherwise we have to
suppress it by setting χm := 0. This will not be possible,
if both |A˜m0|
2/(A∗0A∗m) and |A˜m0|
2/(A∗0A∗,d⊖m) are
greater than 1, which shows the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Non-correctability)
After the application of a B
(d)
n step for sufficiently large
n to a U2-invariant Bell-diagonal state with A∗0 > 1/2,
the output state is symmetrically extendible, if there hold
the inequalities |A˜m0|
2 < A∗0 · max {A∗m, A∗,d⊖m} for
all m ∈ {1, . . . , d− 1}.
In the apparently-isotropic case, that is the case where
we enforce A∗m = (1 − A∗0)/(d − 1) for all m 6= 0, the
condition reads(
maxd−1m=1 |A˜m0|
)2
< A∗0 ·
1−A∗0
d− 1
. (9)
If we replace “<” by “>”, this is our sufficient condi-
tion for correctability [15], so that these two results are
complementary (apart from the case of equality).
A particularly simple and instructive case is the
generalised-isotropic case [14, 15]. In the U2-invariant
case, we have two non-negative real parameters α and β
which fulfil α + (d − 1)β ≤ 1, and the coefficients of the
state are given by
Alm =


α, if l = m = 0,
β, if l 6= m = 0,
1−α−(d−1)β
d(d−1) else.
(10)
Denoting x := α+ (d− 1)β, we thus compute
A˜ip =
{
x, if i = p,
α− β, else
, A∗m =
{
x, if m = 0,
1−x
d−1 , else;
(11)
inequality (9) now reads (α−β)2(d− 1) < x · (1−x) and
can be rewritten as
α2 + (d− 1)β2 −
α+ (d− 1)β
d
< 0. (12)
This again is complementary to our result [15], that a
state can indeed be corrected, if the left-hand side is
strictly positive, leaving apart the case where we have
equality.
To conclude this letter, we have used a criterion for the
symmetric extendibility (Theorem 1) within the class of
U2-invariant two-qudit states in order to show that stan-
dard two-way error-correction procedures (B
(d)
n steps)
cannot be used to improve on the already known con-
structive bounds stated e. g. in [13, 14, 15] by any type
of one-way communication. This was done by choosing
a well-suited class of matrices for that problem, which
enabled us to derive upper bounds; these bounds coin-
cide with the previously known bounds, thereby showing
their sharpness. In particular, our results coincide with
those of Myhr et al. [10] in the case of qubits (d = 2).
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